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In the run-up to the global ﬁnancial crisis, development aid in-
creased markedly, reaching a peak around the Gleneagles sum-
mit in 2005 (Figure 1). 1 However, the strains caused by the
2008–09 downturn on public ﬁnances in donor countries raised
concerns that the supply of aid would decline. Although the
immediate impact of the crisis onaidﬂowswasnot asdeleterious
as expected, the risk that development aid will fall is still loom-
ing. Given the prolonged recession and uncertain economic
prospects facing a number of leading donor countries, it is
natural to ask whether aid ﬂows are at risk of being cut in the
near future. To answer this question, we must examine the link
between aid ﬂows on the one hand, and macroeconomic ﬂuctu-
ations in donor and recipient countries on the other.
We empirically assess how donor- and recipient-country
macroeconomic conditions aﬀect foreign aid ﬂows, focusing
on both “normal” business cycle ﬂuctuations and “unusually
large” adverse shocks. Speciﬁcally, we provide answers to
the following questions: To what extent does the business cycle
in donor countries inﬂuence their aid outlays? Has this impact
been large and persistent during past recessions? Similarly,
how do macroeconomic conditions in aid-dependent countries
inﬂuence their aid receipts? What happens to aid ﬂows during
synchronized recessions—in which both the donor and the re-
cipient experience large negative shocks? We tackle these ques-
tions using an empirical aid allocation model to which we add
a wide range of business cycle variables and measures of large
macroeconomic shocks. Our dataset represents bilateral
(country-pair) aid ﬂows from 22 OECD donors to 113 aid
recipients over 1970–2005.
We ﬁnd that foreign aid is on average procyclical with re-
spect to the donor and recipient output cycles, rising during
expansions and falling during recessions. 2 In particular, do-
nors reduce aid outlays signiﬁcantly during periods of severe44economic stress. But bilateral aid becomes countercyclical
when aid recipients are hit by large adverse shocks, increasing
signiﬁcantly during sustained episodes of negative growth and
terms-of-trade (TOT) collapses. These eﬀects tend to be persis-
tent. When both the donor and recipient country experience
large negative macroeconomic ﬂuctuations, there is no addi-
tional impact on aid ﬂows. Our results are robust to alterna-
tive deﬁnitions of aid ﬂows and across speciﬁcations and
estimation techniques.
We estimate an empirical aid allocation model using a rich
panel dataset with information on country-pair aid ﬂows
and country characteristics. The three-way nature of the panel
aﬀords us a number of advantages over standard donor- or re-
cipient-level models employed in the literature. First, bilateral
data provide a rich amount of variation, allowing us to esti-
mate the model on sample sizes of almost 90,000 observations
and increasing the precision of our estimates. Second, we can
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Figure 1. Bilateral ODA, 1970–2009. Notes: Figures are expressed in 2008
US$ billion. Sample comprises 22 OECD donors. Bilateral Net ODA*
excludes humanitarian aid, development food aid, and debt relief grants.
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controlling for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity in
the donor-recipient relationships (which is subsumed into
country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects). Third, the data enable us to assess
the impact of country-level variables such as negative eco-
nomic shocks that simultaneously aﬀect the donor and the re-
cipient. Fourth, bilateral data help reduce concerns regarding
reversed causation that plague traditional country-level panel
regressions because the dependent variable captures pair-level
information while many regressors vary at the country level.
Our work closely relates to the handful of studies that have
singled out the role of business cycles and crises in donor
countries in determining aid allocations. Pallage and Robe
(2001) ﬁnd inconclusive evidence on the relationship between
business cycles in donor countries and aid disbursements to
Africa over 1969–92, but present some evidence of procyclical-
ity of aid commitments. Mold, Olcer, and Prizzon (2008) ar-
gue that the relationship between economic growth in donor
countries and their aid outlays is ambiguous. They show that
aid ﬂows and GDP tend to co-move over long periods, but aid
often “decouples” from economic growth in OECD countries.
Faini (2006) ﬁnds no statistical relationship between the out-
put gap as a measure of the cyclical position of donor coun-
tries and aid ﬂows over 1980–2004. By contrast, Bertoli,
Cornia, and Manaresi (2008) document a robust positive rela-
tionship between the same measure of the cycle and aggregate
aid ﬂows over 1970–2004. Allen and Giovannetti (2009) ar-
gued that the output gap does not explain aid ﬂows, but its
cube has a negative and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient,
which they interpret as a more than proportional impact of
the cycle on aid allocations.
The recent crisis has spurred new work on the link between
conditions in donor countries and aid ﬂows. Using donor-level
regressions, Dang et al. (2009) show that aid falls substantially
after systemic banking crises after controlling for their impact
on output. Frot (2009) estimates that banking crises in donor
countries cause reductions in aid by 13% on average (level ef-
fect) and by 5% yearly after the onset of a crisis (trend eﬀect).
Mendoza, Jones, and Vergara (2009) ﬁnd that stock market
volatility in the United States of America—a proxy for ﬁnan-
cial stress and economic uncertainty—is associated with lower
aid disbursements. We expand this line of research by showing
that there is a robust and systematic average relationshipbetween donor country conditions and aid disbursements.
We also document interesting heterogeneity in donor behavior
by showing that donors’ tendency to disburse procyclically rel-
ative to their own cycle is inversely related to the quality of
their aid-related activities.
With respect to the recipient-country cycle, most of the
existing evidence, including ours, suggests that foreign aid is
procyclical with respect to output and revenues. For instance,
Pallage and Robe (2001) show that in half of developing coun-
tries and in most African economies there is a high positive
correlation between the cyclical component of aid receipts
and that of domestic output. 3 As Svensson (2000) shows
analytically, this procyclical result can be explained by moral
hazard arguments: in the second-best equilibrium with unver-
iﬁable government actions, the donor ties aid disbursements to
the recipient country’s macroeconomic performance because
they cannot distinguish whether downturns are caused by
exogenous shocks or by macroeconomic mismanagement.
Pallage, Robe, and Beroube (2006) argue that foreign aid
can act as insurance against macroeconomic shocks in devel-
oping countries, reducing macroeconomic volatility, and ben-
eﬁtting long-run growth. Our results support this idea but also
provide some nuance: not only donors’ aid policy becomes
countercyclical when developing countries experience unusu-
ally severe economic stress (caused, e.g., by TOT collapses
or climatic disasters), this eﬀect is stronger in countries with
more transparent institutions. Our results then suggest that
higher-quality institutions can help resolve the aid monitoring
problem (see Banerjee, 2010).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2 we describe the data and introduce our key variables.
We discuss the baseline empirical model, the estimation
method, and report the main ﬁndings in Section 3. Section 4
presents robustness checks and Section 5 concludes. Detailed
information on the data sources, the list of countries, sum-
mary statistics, and additional results are available in an
online appendix. 42. DATA, DEFINITIONS, AND DESCRIPTIVE STATIS-
TICS
(a) Data and deﬁnitions of aid and business cycle variables
We construct our dataset starting with OECD-DAC infor-
mation on bilateral aid ﬂows from 22 donors to 113 recipients
over the period 1970–2005, giving us about 90,000 observa-
tions. 5 Our dependent variable is real bilateral foreign aid, de-
ﬁned as bilateral oﬃcial development assistance (ODA) net of
principal repayments. From this aggregate we subtract
humanitarian emergency aid, emergency food aid, and debt
forgiveness grants, since these may be primarily driven by
shocks in recipient countries and hence not have the same
cyclical properties as regular development ﬂows.
A potential problem with using bilateral ﬂows is that the
data contain many zero entries. Dropping these observations
may bias our results if such entries were nonrandom, for in-
stance by reﬂecting unobserved characteristics of the donor-re-
cipient pair. Following Arndt, Jones, and Tarp (2010), we
retain these zeros since they mainly represent unreported null
values rather than absent data. In addition, we adopt a semi-
log transformation of the form 6:
aidijt
 ¼ signðaidijtÞ logð1þ jaidijtjÞ;
where aidijt denotes real bilateral aid from donor i to recipient j
at time t. With this transformation of the dependent variable,
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negative observations. 7 The estimated coeﬃcients in the or-
dinary least squares (OLS) regressions can be interpreted as
(semi-) elasticities for large values of aid (Eichengreen & Irwin,
1998).
We consider a range of variables to measure the business cy-
cle of donors and recipients. For donor countries, proxies for
the output cycle are constructed by separating the permanent
from the transitory component of GDP to obtain the output
gap. We do this alternately through a log-linear regression
of real output against time or using the OECD methodology
for estimating the output gap. While the former approach is
purely statistical, the latter is based on estimation of a produc-
tion function (for details, see Beﬀy, Ollivaud, Richardson, &
Sedillot, 2006). The two output gap estimates have a correla-
tion coeﬃcient of 0.56 (statistically signiﬁcant at the 99% le-
vel). Our third proxy for the donor cycle is a dummy for
years of above- (below) trend real growth, capturing economic
expansions (recessions).
Quantifying economic ﬂuctuations is more diﬃcult in aid-
receiving countries, particularly in low-income countries that
are undergoing structural transformation and are subject to
more frequent and severe shocks. Rand and Tarp (2002) argue
that short-runmacroeconomic ﬂuctuations in developing coun-
tries diﬀermarkedly from those in advanced countries. Thebusi-
ness cycle is shorter because of frequent and large shocks, and
recessions are typically deeper and longer. 8 Our ﬁrst proxy
for the cycle in recipient countries is the output gap calculated
using theHodrick–Prescott (HP) ﬁlter, adjusting the smoothing
parameter k to allow for shorter cycles (k = 1 as opposed to 10
or 100 as is customary for yearly data) and dropping endpoints.
We add to the output gap two additionalmeasures of recessions,
namely twodummyvariables for years of below-trendGDPand
consumption growth, respectively.
For all countries, we also construct measures of large mac-
roeconomic shocks to determine whether aid ﬂows behave dif-
ferently during times of extreme macroeconomic stress. For
donors, large shocks are captured with dummies for those
years when the output gap or growth deviations from trend
fall into the bottom quartile of the donor-speciﬁc distribution.
For recipients, we focus on (i) unusually large adverse TOT
movements—measured as year-on-year growth rates that fall
in the bottom decile of the recipient-speciﬁc distribution 9;
(ii) climatic shocks referring to years in which the recipient
economy experienced ﬂoods, drought, extreme temperature
variations, and windstorms; and (iii) growth collapse episodes
of at least 3 years when the country experiences a sustained
deceleration to negative growth (Hausmann et al., 2008).
Our ﬁrst two proxies for the recipient cycle—TOT and cli-
matic shocks—are external shocks associated with short-term
ﬂuctuations in international commodity prices or agricultural
output, and account for a relatively small share of output
instability in low-income countries (Raddatz, 2007). In con-
trast, growth collapses are protracted downturns and may
be caused not only by external shocks, but also by internal
factors such as civil strife and political instability (Minoiu
& Reddy, 2009).
(b) Data exploration: descriptive statistics
We start the empirical analysis by looking at simple descrip-
tive statistics of the cycle variables, including their correlations
with bilateral aid ﬂows. Summary statistics for the full sample
are presented in Table 1.
The 22 OECD donors in our sample have experienced rela-
tively small ﬂuctuations in economic activity since the 1970s.The box-plots in Figure 2 show that most of the donor output
gap observations are between 2 and +2 percentage points of
GDP (Panel A), with few extreme observations. The number
of extreme output gap estimates is noticeably larger for aid-
receiving countries (Panel B). Both output gap distributions
have become narrower over time, reﬂecting a general fall in
aggregate volatility toward the end of the sample period.
Simple correlation coeﬃcients between diﬀerent measures of
the business cycle in donor and recipient countries and aggre-
gate aid ﬂows (scaled by GDP) are depicted in Figure 3. The
plots suggest that most donors disburse aid procyclically rela-
tive to their economy (Panels A and B). It is less clear how
they disburse relative to the recipient economy as the correla-
tion coeﬃcients are more heterogeneous and their distribution
is centered on zero (Panels C and D).3. THE BASELINE MODEL AND MAIN EMPIRICAL
RESULTS
(a) The baseline model and estimation method
To investigate the impact of business cycle ﬂuctuations and
large macroeconomic shocks on bilateral aid ﬂows, we use the
following econometric speciﬁcation:
aidijt
 ¼ aij þ bCONTROLSijt þ cCYCLEitdonor þ dCYCLEjtrec
þ ct þ eijt;
where aidijt
 represents real (semi-log transformed) bilateral
aid ﬂows; aij denotes country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects; b is a vector
of coeﬃcients on time-varying control variables that capture
scale eﬀects (such as population and GDP trend);
CYCLEdonor and CYCLErec refer to variables that capture
the business cycle in the donor and recipient country, respec-
tively; ct represents time eﬀects that control for global shocks
and partly capture pre-existing trends (Plu¨mper & Neumayer,
2010); and eijt is a well-behaved error term. The country-pair
ﬁxed eﬀects aij allow us to control for time-invariant country-
pair features (such as past colonial ties, sharing a common
language, other forms of cultural proximity, and geographi-
cal distance) that may inﬂuence the likelihood of a bilateral
relationship.
Our key covariates CYCLEdonor and CYCLErec vary only at
the donor- and recipient level, respectively, while the depen-
dent variable varies at the country-pair level. This attenuates
endogeneity concerns associated with causality running from
aid ﬂows to the output cycle variables, especially in the case
of recipient countries. We estimate this parsimonious model
both for the full sample and the sub-samples of low- and mid-
dle-income countries using the OLS estimator with a full set of
country-pair and time ﬁxed eﬀects. We cluster the standard er-
rors on country-pair to exploit residual within-country-pair
correlation. 10
(b) Results: aid and the donor cycle
The empirical results on the link between aid disbursements
and the donor output cycle are summarized in Table 2. We
ﬁnd that expansions in donor countries, captured by a higher
output gap or above-trend real growth, are accompanied by
higher aid ﬂows (Panel A). A one percentage point increase
in the donor output gap (as a share of potential GDP) raises
real aid disbursements on average by between 8.3% and
11.6% depending on the output gap estimate (columns 1 and
2). 11 On average, expansions raise aid outlays by one ﬁfth
Table 1. Summary statistics
No. Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Donors (N = 22)
Output gap (% potential GDP) 89,496 0.14 5.31 19.14 21.81
Output gap (OECD) (% potential GDP) 78,987 0.41 2.32 9.20 6.70
1 = Above-trend GDP growth 87,010 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00
Log-GDP trend 89,496 26.47 1.44 22.68 30.15
Log-population 89,496 16.47 1.43 12.79 19.51
Recipients – Full sample (N = 113)
Output gap (% potential GDP) 81,290 0.00 2.99 40.91 19.19
1 = Below-trend GDP growth 78,804 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00
1 = Below-trend consumption growth 71,896 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00
1 = TOT growth rate in bottom decile 84,744 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
1 = Climatic disaster 89,496 0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00
1 = Growth collapse 89,496 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00
Log-GDP trend 81,290 23.65 2.01 18.26 29.76
Log-population 82,786 15.68 1.87 10.82 20.99
War index 74,008 1.08 2.11 0.00 13.00
Institutional quality (Polity IV) 73,964 0.89 6.83 10.00 10.00
Country-pairs (N = 2,486)
Log-real aid* (net ﬂows) 89,496 7.57 8.31 20.77 21.82
Log-real aid* (gross ﬂows) 89,496 8.27 7.64 18.33 22.81
Log-real net aid transfers 89,496 0.92 1.52 7.15 8.10
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Figure 2. Distribution of output gap estimates. Notes: The chart depicts horizontal box-plots of output gap estimates for donor and recipient countries, by
decade. The left and right edges of each box are the ﬁrst and third quartiles, and the band inside the box is the median. In Panel B, output gap observations have
been winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile.
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ﬂows with respect to the donor cycle documented in earlier aid
allocation studies, albeit with diﬀerent measures of the donor
cycle (e.g., Bertoli et al., 2008; Frot, 2009). In addition, we ﬁnd
no systematic diﬀerence across income groups, as the esti-
mated semi-elasticities have similar magnitudes across sub-
samples (columns 4–9).
When donors experience severe economic stress, they reduce
aid outlays substantially (Table 2, Panel B). In these speciﬁca-
tions, unusually harsh conditions are captured by dummies for
the output gap or a deviation of growth from trend falling in
the bottom quartile of the donor-speciﬁc distribution. In years
with large negative output gap, aid outlays fall by between
27.4% and 58.9% in the full sample, depending on the gap
measure (columns 1–2). Growth recessions reduce aid dis-
bursements by 11.3% on average (column 3). Interestingly,
aid ﬂows to middle-income countries appear less sensitive to
the donor cycle, as the estimated coeﬃcients are systematically
lower than for low-income countries (columns 4–9). Thissuggests that in the face of large economic downturns, donors
have historically reduced aid outlays to low-income countries
by more than to middle-income countries. A possible explana-
tion is that during sharp downturns, donors become more
concerned over how aid is being managed by the recipient gov-
ernment and whether aid ultimately spurs development. Since
institutional quality—a rough indicator of how transparently
aid is spent—tends to be poorer in low-income countries, do-
nors may be more prone to reducing disbursements to these
countries relative to those with a better institutional environ-
ment.
Are these results symmetric? Taking the same approach to
constructing proxies for the donor’s cyclical positions, we
check whether the patterns identiﬁed so far hold up for unusu-
ally favorable economic conditions. Our measures of economic
boom are dummy variables for deviations of output and
output growth from their respective trends falling in the top
quartile of the donor-speciﬁc distribution. As depicted in
Table 2 (Panel C), the estimated semi-elasticities are close in
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Figure 3. Unconditional correlations between aid and the business cycle. (A) Correlation between aid and the donor output gap. (B) Correlation between aid
and the donor expansion (above-trend GDP growth) dummy. (C) Histogram of correlations between aid and the recipient output gap. (D) Histogram of
correlations between aid and the recipient recession (below-trend GDP growth) dummy. Notes: The chart depicts unconditional contemporaneous correlations
between aid and the output gap (panels A and B) and the histogram of correlations (panels C and D). Aid is expressed in ratio to GDP. Greece is omitted from
the charts.
48 WORLD DEVELOPMENTmagnitude (and of opposite sign) to those for large negative
shocks. Big economic booms in donor countries have
historically caused aid to increase by 20–100%, depending on
the measure used (columns 1–3).
It is important to determine whether the average eﬀects doc-
umented above conceal heterogeneity in donor behavior. Pa-
nel A in Figure 4 depicts donor-speciﬁc marginal eﬀects of a
rise by one percentage point in the donor output gap on that
donor’s bilateral aid ﬂows. 12 The estimates range between
large and positive for the United States and the United King-
dom—the most “procyclical” donors—and negative for Aus-
tralia, Austria, and Belgium—the most “countercyclical”
donors. By contrast, countries such as Ireland, Greece, and
Germany display acyclical behavior.
Could donor inclination toward pro- or countercyclical aid
disbursements be correlated with other donor characteristics?
To tackle this question, we consider donor features summarized
in the CGD Aid Commitment to Development Index for 2010
(Roodman, 2005; Roodman & Walz, 2010). The index aims to
capture the quality of donor foreign aid-related policies. It re-
wards donors that give more aid (in absolute terms and relative
to GDP) and relatively more grants and nontied aid, as well as
donors who target poor noncorrupt countries and encourage
charitable giving. Interestingly, the degree of donor procyclical-
ity is negatively correlated with this aid-quality index (Figure 4,
Panel B), which suggests that more development-oriented do-
nors-those who rank higher according to this index-tend to dis-
burse acyclically or even countercylically. This ﬁnding provides
a new nuance to the deﬁnition of a “development-friendly” do-
nor—that is, a donorwhodisburses aid in away relatively insen-
sitive to their own output cycle.(c) Results: aid and the recipient cycle
Results for the baseline speciﬁcation that includes mea-
sures of the output cycle in recipient countries are shown in
Table 3. These are similar to our previous regressions, except
that now we control for the donor output trend and gap, and
add proxies for the recipient cycle. In addition, we add a re-
cipient war index as a control variable because donors tend to
limit their engagement in development activities and post-
pone new projects during periods of social unrest or civil
war, which tend to coincide with economic downturns.
Including the recipient war index allows us to discern
whether economic downturns in recipient countries are asso-
ciated with lower aid disbursements above and beyond the di-
rect impact of war on donor behavior.
We ﬁnd that bilateral aid disbursements are on average
procyclical vis-a`-vis the recipient cycle, with decreases by
10.4–19.7% in recession years (Panel A, columns 2 and 3).
The coeﬃcient on our measure of the recipient output gap is
statistically insigniﬁcant—a possible indication of attenuation
bias caused by measurement error (column 1). Furthermore,
aid ﬂows respond mostly to the output cycle in middle-income
countries, with aid falling by 19.7–26.7% during years of
below-trend output or consumption growth (columns 8 and
9). The sub-sample of middle-income countries drives the
results for the full sample. While our results are consistent
with other studies that have documented foreign aid to be
on average procyclical with respect to the recipient cycle (Bulir
& Hamann, 2008; Pallage & Robe, 2001), they reveal that the
procyclicality is present for middle- rather than low-income
countries.
Table 2. Impact of the donor cycle on aid
Full sample Low-income Middle-income
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Panel A – “Regular” cycle
Log-Recipient GDP 0.76*** 0.88*** 0.76*** 1.29*** 1.21** 1.20*** 1.37*** 1.67*** 1.40***
(0.26) (0.30) (0.26) (0.42) (0.48) (0.43) (0.34) (0.39) (0.35)
Log-Recipient population 3.14*** 3.79*** 3.38*** 1.59 1.36 1.51 3.95*** 4.73*** 4.19***
(0.64) (0.73) (0.65) (1.45) (1.70) (1.48) (0.73) (0.84) (0.76)
Log-Donor population 0.60 1.10 1.92 5.85*** 4.27 2.99 2.01 3.75 4.35*
(1.70) (1.93) (1.77) (2.20) (2.60) (2.32) (2.30) (2.58) (2.39)
Log-Donor GDP trend 5.30*** 3.99*** 5.27*** 8.90*** 8.17*** 9.04*** 3.52*** 1.92 3.40***
(0.74) (1.00) (0.77) (1.10) (1.56) (1.14) (0.94) (1.26) (0.97)
Donor output gap 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.10***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Donor output gap (OECD) 0.08*** 0.07** 0.08***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
1 = Donor above-trend (GDP) growth 0.21*** 0.16** 0.24***
(0.05) (0.08) (0.07)
Observations 81,290 72,344 79,178 26,708 23,730 26,004 54,582 48,614 53,174
Within R-squared 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.14 0.10 0.12 0.08 0.06 0.07
Number of country-pairs 2,486 2,486 2,486 814 814 814 1,672 1,672 1,672
Panel B – Large negative shocks
Log-Recipient GDP 0.76*** 0.76*** 0.76*** 1.29*** 1.29*** 1.29*** 1.37*** 1.37*** 1.37***
(0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.42) (0.43) (0.43) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34)
Log-Recipient population 3.14*** 3.14*** 3.14*** 1.59 1.59 1.59 3.95*** 3.95*** 3.95***
(0.64) (0.64) (0.64) (1.46) (1.46) (1.46) (0.74) (0.74) (0.74)
Log-Donor population 0.65 1.58 1.51 4.43** 3.30 3.39 3.17 4.00* 3.94*
(1.70) (1.71) (1.71) (2.21) (2.25) (2.25) (2.29) (2.30) (2.30)
Log-Donor GDP trend 5.23*** 4.90*** 4.92*** 8.81*** 8.41*** 8.43*** 3.45*** 3.16*** 3.17***
(0.74) (0.74) (0.74) (1.11) (1.10) (1.10) (0.94) (0.94) (0.94)
1 = Output gap in bottom quartile 0.89*** 1.10*** 0.79***
(0.09) (0.13) (0.11)
1 = Output gap in bottom quartile (OECD) 0.32*** 0.42*** 0.27**
(0.08) (0.12) (0.11)
1 = Growth deviation in bottom quartile 0.12* 0.20** 0.08
(0.07) (0.09) (0.09)
Observations 81,290 81,290 81,290 26,708 26,708 26,708 54,582 54,582 54,582
Within R-squared 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.07 0.07 0.07
Number of country-pairs 2,486 2,486 2,486 814 814 814 1,672 1,672 1,672
Panel C – Large positive shocks
Log-Recipient GDP 0.76*** 0.76*** 0.76*** 1.29*** 1.29*** 1.29*** 1.37*** 1.37*** 1.37***
(0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.42) (0.43) (0.43) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34)
Log-Recipient population 3.14*** 3.14*** 3.14*** 1.59 1.59 1.59 3.95*** 3.95*** 3.95***
(0.64) (0.64) (0.64) (1.45) (1.46) (1.45) (0.74) (0.73) (0.74)
Log-Donor population 0.82 1.35 1.55 4.23* 3.52 3.34 3.33 3.78* 3.97*
(1.71) (1.70) (1.71) (2.23) (2.25) (2.25) (2.31) (2.29) (2.30)
Log-Donor GDP trend 4.82*** 4.99*** 4.88*** 8.31*** 8.49*** 8.38*** 3.08*** 3.25*** 3.14***
(0.74) (0.74) (0.74) (1.09) (1.10) (1.10) (0.94) (0.94) (0.94)
1 = Output gap in top quartile 0.73*** 0.90*** 0.64***
(0.07) (0.10) (0.09)
1 = Output gap in top quartile (OECD) 0.38*** 0.31*** 0.41***
(0.08) (0.10) (0.10)
1 = Growth deviation in top quartile 0.18*** 0.25** 0.15*
(0.06) (0.10) (0.08)
Observations 81,290 81,290 81,290 26,708 26,708 26,708 54,582 54,582 54,582
Within R-squared 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.07 0.07 0.07
Number of country-pairs 2,486 2,486 2,486 814 814 814 1,672 1,672 1,672
Notes: The dependent variable is given by semi-log transformed real aid ﬂows. All speciﬁcations include country-pair and year ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard
errors are clustered on country-pair.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% signiﬁcance level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% signiﬁcance level.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% signiﬁcance level.
BUSINESS CYCLE FLUCTUATIONS, LARGE MACROECONOMIC SHOCKS, AND DEVELOPMENT AID 49
Table 3. Impact of the recipient cycle on aid
Full sample Low-income Middle-income
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Panel A – “Regular” cycle
Log-Recipient population 4.75*** 4.83*** 5.18*** 1.97 1.85 2.09 6.17*** 6.30*** 6.70***
(0.73) (0.75) (0.84) (1.49) (1.51) (1.56) (0.86) (0.89) (0.98)
Log-Donor population 0.82 0.19 0.21 5.19** 4.75** 4.71* 1.58 2.32 2.75
(1.84) (1.91) (2.05) (2.25) (2.31) (2.50) (2.57) (2.67) (2.81)
Log-Donor GDP trend 5.98*** 6.06*** 6.15*** 9.41*** 9.66*** 9.87*** 4.10*** 4.08*** 4.23***
(0.78) (0.81) (0.87) (1.13) (1.16) (1.27) (1.02) (1.05) (1.11)
Donor output gap, log-linear 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Log-Rec GDP trend 1.35*** 1.34*** 1.78*** 0.82* 0.76 0.96* 2.07*** 2.10*** 2.59***
(0.32) (0.33) (0.37) (0.46) (0.47) (0.52) (0.44) (0.45) (0.48)
Recipient war index 0.27*** 0.26*** 0.22*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.20*** 0.24*** 0.22*** 0.18***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Recipient output gap 0.00 0.02** 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
1 = Recipient below-trend (GDP) growth 0.11** 0.08 0.22***
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07)
1 = Recipient below-trend (cons.) growth 0.22*** 0.04 0.31***
(0.06) (0.08) (0.08)
Observations 72,248 70,246 63,844 25,102 24,442 21,296 47,146 45,804 42,548
Within R-squared 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.08 0.07 0.07
Number of country-pairs 2,288 2,288 2,134 792 792 682 1,496 1,496 1,452
Panel B – Large negative shocks
Log-Recipient population 4.36*** 4.77*** 4.90*** 2.39 2.06 2.12 5.61*** 6.15*** 6.57***
(0.75) (0.73) (0.73) (1.52) (1.49) (1.49) (0.88) (0.86) (0.86)
Log-Donor population 0.75 0.82 0.82 5.51** 5.19** 5.19** 1.69 1.58 1.58
(1.87) (1.84) (1.84) (2.29) (2.25) (2.25) (2.57) (2.57) (2.56)
Log-Donor GDP trend 5.87*** 5.98*** 5.98*** 9.32*** 9.41*** 9.41*** 4.11*** 4.10*** 4.10***
(0.80) (0.78) (0.78) (1.18) (1.13) (1.13) (1.02) (1.02) (1.02)
Donor output gap 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.10***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Log-Recipient GDP trend 1.60*** 1.36*** 1.21*** 1.06** 0.81* 0.83* 2.29*** 2.07*** 1.74***
(0.34) (0.32) (0.32) (0.50) (0.46) (0.46) (0.45) (0.44) (0.44)
Recipient war 0.23*** 0.27*** 0.28*** 0.21*** 0.23*** 0.25*** 0.20*** 0.24*** 0.23***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
1 = Recipient large TOT shock 0.20** 0.14 0.21
(0.10) (0.14) (0.13)
1 = Recipient climatic disaster 0.25*** 0.01 0.37***
(0.07) (0.09) (0.09)
1 = Recipient growth collapse 0.52*** 0.37** 0.65***
(0.13) (0.17) (0.18)
Observations 69,696 72,248 72,248 23,144 25,102 25,102 46,552 47,146 47,146
Within R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.08 0.08 0.08
Number of country-pairs 2,156 2,288 2,288 704 792 792 1,452 1,496 1,496
Notes: Same as Table 2.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% signiﬁcance level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% signiﬁcance level.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% signiﬁcance level.
50 WORLD DEVELOPMENTWe next explore whether aid ﬂows behave similarly when
aid-receiving countries experience large macroeconomic
shocks. We add to the speciﬁcations three binary variables,
representing, respectively, years when TOT growth rates fall
into the bottom decile of each recipient’s TOT growth distri-
bution; the country experiences a climatic disaster such as
ﬂoods, drought, extreme temperatures, or windstorms; and
there is a sustained deceleration to negative income growth.
Compared to ﬁlter-based estimates of output/growth gap,
these variables are less likely to suﬀer from measurement
error. Furthermore, they are likely to be exogenous withrespect to pair-wise aid ﬂows. Growth collapses are arguably
exogenous since a shock to aid disbursements from any par-
ticular donor is unlikely to trigger a multi-year growth col-
lapse in a recipient country. Hausmann et al. (2008) show
that the onset of growth collapses is typically associated with
wars, dramatic falls in exports, sudden stops, and political
transitions—variables that can also be treated as exogenous
relative to pair-wise aid ﬂows. TOT shocks are exogenous
insofar as commodity export prices are not driven by individ-
ual country actions that may also aﬀect bilateral aid ﬂows
(Deaton & Miller, 1996).
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Figure 4. Donor heterogeneity in development aid cyclicality. (A) Donor-speciﬁc marginal eﬀects of output gap on aid ﬂows. (B) Marginal eﬀects and the
2010 Aid Commitment-to-Development index. Notes: Panel A depicts marginal eﬀects of an increase by one percentage point (of potential GDP) of the output
gap by donor. These are the semi-elasticity coeﬃcient estimates on donor output gap (% of potential GDP) from individual donor-level OLS regressions of
bilateral aid on the following set of covariates: recipient log-GDP, recipient log-population, donor log-population, donor log-GDP trend, donor output gap, and
recipient ﬁxed eﬀects.
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recipients attract higher aid disbursements in the wake of these
large negative shocks. Bilateral aid to countries aﬄicted by
large TOT shocks increases on average by one-ﬁfth for the
full-sample. When countries experience a climatic disaster,
aid disbursements are higher by almost 30% on a yearly ba-
sis—which is notable given that humanitarian and emergency
food aid are not captured in our dependent variable. Similarly,
growth collapses attract signiﬁcantly higher bilateral aid
ﬂows—68.2% in the full sample—some 44% for low-income
countries and twice as much for middle-income countries.
The results are once again stronger in the sample of middle-in-
come countries.
The fact that bilateral aid to low-income countries rises less
than to middle-income countries during growth collapses may
be explained by many of these episodes being caused by con-
ﬂict or political strife, which may be only partially captured
by our war index variable. Any omitted variables positively
correlated with periods of downturn but negatively correlated
with aid would lead to a negative bias on the growth collapse
coeﬃcient. Furthermore, it is possible that for low-income
countries with severe ﬁnancial constraints, a bigger share of
bilateral aid is disbursed as humanitarian and emergency food
aid during such periods. Finally, insofar as growth disasters in
low-income countries are seen as the result of domestic causes
(such as economic mismanagement), bilateral donors may be
hesitant to disburse countercyclically because of concerns over
the quality of macroeconomic policies and the eﬀectiveness of
aid.
We also checked whether the quality of institutions in aid-
receiving economies inﬂuences the cyclical properties of for-
eign aid. Banerjee (2010) argues that, conditional on a good
institutional environment, aid acts as insurance in the wake
of large adverse shocks. This may be because better macroeco-
nomic management, enabled by better institutions, partly
resolves the aid monitoring problem. As a proxy for institu-
tions, we use the Polity IV measure of democracy, which varies
between 10 (autocracy) and +10 (democracy) and captures
the extent to which the executive faces political constraints
to implementing her policy.
Estimated coeﬃcients from the baseline speciﬁcation that in-
cludes the Polity IV measure and interactions with developing
country business cycle measures are reported in Table 4. First,
we ﬁnd that aid-receiving countries with better institutions
attract higher aid ﬂows on average, even after controllingfor income (through recipient log-GDP trend). This level eﬀect
largely reﬂects aid selectivity (as documented, for instance, in
Dollar & Levin, 2006). Second, the estimated coeﬃcients on
the interactions between institutions on the one hand, and
large negative shocks, on the other, are positive and statisti-
cally signiﬁcant in the full sample, suggesting that aid may
have a stronger average cushioning eﬀect in countries with
better institutions. However, these results are driven by mid-
dle- rather than low-income countries.
To sum up, our ﬁnding that bilateral aid increases markedly
in the face of large TOT shocks, climatic disasters, and growth
collapses, are novel in the aid allocation literature and under-
score the potential of development aid to mitigate the eﬀects of
adverse shocks. Collier and Dehn (2001) and Collier and
Goderis (2009) have shown that negative commodity export
price shocks reduce short-term growth but aid can substan-
tially reduce that eﬀect, and have called for aid to be better tar-
geted at shock-prone countries. Our estimates support these
recommendations and suggest that bilateral donors have his-
torically increased ﬁnancing to developing countries after ad-
verse macroeconomic ﬂuctuations. Good institutions have
strengthened this eﬀect for middle-income countries. More
research is needed, however, to determine whether this higher
ﬁnancing has cushioned the impact of the shocks on real
output.
(d) Results: dynamic eﬀects and simultaneous shocks
After exploring the contemporaneous cyclical properties of
foreign aid, we turn to speciﬁcations that allow for the cycle
to have a lagged eﬀect on aid. These allow for the fact that
aid disbursements are typically locked into multi-year budgets
and cannot be easily adjusted when recipients needs suddenly
change. In Table 5 we report the results of our baseline regres-
sions with large shocks in which we allow for lagged eﬀects.
The shocks considered are, for donors, dummies for the log-
linear and OECD output gap falling in the bottom quartile
(columns 1 and 2), the growth deviation from trend falling
in the bottom quartile (column 3); and for recipients, negative
TOT shocks (column 4), climatic disasters (column 5), and
growth collapses (column 6).
Large ﬂuctuations in donor countries have a persistent eﬀect
on aid outlays, reducing them for up to 2 years after recessions
(columns 1–3). The result is robust across various measures for
the donor cycle. When it comes to the recipient cycle, negative
Table 4. Impact of institutions on the link between the recipient cycle and aid
Full sample Low-income Middle-income
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Log-Recipient population 4.06*** 4.07*** 4.25*** 3.02** 2.87** 2.90** 4.68*** 4.59*** 5.04***
(0.74) (0.72) (0.73) (1.46) (1.42) (1.42) (0.87) (0.85) (0.87)
Log-Donor population 0.84 0.87 0.87 5.77** 5.43** 5.43** 1.66 1.61 1.61
(1.87) (1.84) (1.84) (2.28) (2.24) (2.24) (2.55) (2.53) (2.55)
Log-Donor GDP trend 5.84*** 5.95*** 5.95*** 9.25*** 9.35*** 9.35*** 4.11*** 4.10*** 4.10***
(0.79) (0.78) (0.78) (1.18) (1.14) (1.14) (1.01) (1.00) (1.00)
Donor output gap 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Log-Recipient GDP trend 1.34*** 1.29*** 1.16*** 0.81* 0.60 0.64 1.61*** 1.60*** 1.42***
(0.34) (0.32) (0.32) (0.49) (0.46) (0.46) (0.45) (0.44) (0.45)
Recipient war 0.20*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.18*** 0.21*** 0.23*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.17***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Recipient institutional quality 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.07*** 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.12***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
1 = Recipient large TOT shock 0.14 0.00 0.03
(0.09) (0.16) (0.13)
TOT shock  institutional quality 0.03** 0.04 0.05***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
1 = Recipient climatic disaster 0.20*** 0.07 0.46***
(0.07) (0.11) (0.10)
Climatic disaster  institutional quality 0.05*** 0.01 0.08***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
1 = Recipient growth collapse 0.45*** 0.38* 0.38**
(0.13) (0.19) (0.18)
Growth collapse  institutional quality 0.03** 0.02 0.04**
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 69,366 71,588 71,588 22,836 24,706 24,706 46,530 46,882 46,882
Within R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.08 0.08 0.08
Number of country-pairs 2,156 2,266 2,266 704 770 770 1,452 1,496 1,496
Notes: Same as Table 2.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% signiﬁcance level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% signiﬁcance level.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% signiﬁcance level.
52 WORLD DEVELOPMENTshocks trigger higher bilateral aid ﬂows, with aid ﬂows rising
almost 50% by the third year following a TOT collapse and
by one ﬁfth after a climatic disaster (columns 4–6). Estimated
magnitudes are comparable for negative growth spells through
the ﬁrst three years. It appears that while aid budgets may dis-
play some rigidity due to medium-term planning, aid recipi-
ents do receive more aid in the wake of large exogenous
shocks for a few years after the shock.
Lastly, we focus on the impact on aid ﬂows of macroeco-
nomic shocks simultaneously aﬄicting the donor and the reci-
pient. We modify the baseline speciﬁcation to include
interaction terms between the donor and the recipient mea-
sures for economic ﬂuctuations, as follows:
aidijt
 ¼ aij þ bCONTROLSijt þ cCYCLEitdonor þ dCYCLEjtrec
þ g CYCLEitdonor  CYCLEjtrec
 
þ ct þ eijt;
On the donor side, the cycle is captured by a dummy vari-
able for the output gap falling into the bottom quartile
ðCYCLEitdonorÞ. On the recipient side, we consider all three mea-
sures of large shocks—TOT shock, climatic disaster, and
growth collapse ðCYCLEjtrecÞ—and interact the donor output
with each shock variable in turn ðCYCLEitdonor  CYCLEjtrecÞ.
The results are depicted in Table 5 (columns 7–9). We notice
that the patterns identiﬁed so far are robust to including inter-
action terms for the cyclical position of donors and recipients.However, the coeﬃcients on the interaction terms themselves
are statistically insigniﬁcant. We conclude that when both
the donor and the recipient country simultaneously experience
a large negative shock, aid ﬂows are not aﬀected above and be-
yond the independent impact of the two cycles. In other
words, when donors experience a deep recession, they do not
decrease aid disbursements less if their aid recipients also expe-
rience a deep recession. 134. ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS
In this section we consider a series of sensitivity tests for our
baseline results, which include estimating the model (i) with
alternate deﬁnitions of aid ﬂows; (ii) with diﬀerent speciﬁca-
tions; (iii) across sub-periods; and (iv) with alternate estima-
tion techniques.
(a) Alternative deﬁnitions of aid
We check if our results are sensitive to the deﬁnition of our
dependent variable. So far we have used bilateral ODA net of
principal repayments from which we further subtracted
humanitarian aid, emergency food aid, and debt forgiveness
grants. Here we construct three alternative proxies of
bilateral aid—all aimed at better capturing actual donor
Table 5. Dynamic eﬀects and the impact of simultaneous shocks on aid
Donor cycle Recipient cycle Donor  Recipient cycle
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Log-Recipient GDP 0.78*** 0.78*** 0.78***
(0.27) (0.27) (0.27)
Log-Recipient population 3.59*** 3.59*** 3.59*** 5.47*** 5.99*** 6.16*** 5.04*** 5.46*** 5.62***
(0.67) (0.67) (0.67) (0.82) (0.80) (0.80) (0.79) (0.77) (0.76)
Log-Donor population 1.37 2.86 2.68 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.40 0.43 0.43
(1.83) (1.84) (1.84) (2.02) (1.98) (1.98) (1.87) (1.84) (1.84)
Log-Donor GDP trend 6.07*** 5.58*** 5.61*** 6.08*** 6.24*** 6.24*** 5.85*** 5.98*** 5.98***
(0.81) (0.80) (0.80) (0.86) (0.84) (0.84) (0.80) (0.79) (0.79)
Donor output gap 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Log-Recipient GDP trend 1.69*** 1.51*** 1.18*** 1.64*** 1.40*** 1.21***
(0.36) (0.33) (0.34) (0.34) (0.32) (0.32)
Recipient war index 0.22*** 0.26*** 0.27*** 0.23*** 0.27*** 0.27***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
1 = Donor large shock 0.46*** 0.30*** 0.09 0.90*** 0.89*** 0.87***
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.12)
1 = Donor large shock, t  1 0.31*** 0.11* 0.16***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
1 = Donor large shock, t  2 0.46*** 0.31*** 0.28***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
1 = Recipient large shock 0.15* 0.21*** 0.26** 0.23** 0.26*** 0.53***
(0.09) (0.07) (0.12) (0.11) (0.07) (0.14)
1 = Recipient large shock, t  1 0.21*** 0.23*** 0.19*
(0.08) (0.07) (0.10)
1 = Recipient large shock, t  2 0.42*** 0.19*** 0.23*
(0.08) (0.07) (0.12)
1 = Donor  Recipient large shock 0.12 0.01 0.01
(0.21) (0.15) (0.15)
Observations 77,066 77,066 77,066 64,966 67,298 67,298 68,332 70,752 70,752
Within R-squared 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09
Number of country-pairs 2,486 2,486 2,486 2,178 2,310 2,310 2,178 2,310 2,310
Notes: Same as Table 2. Estimates are based on the full sample. Donors shocks are dummies for the output gap falling in the bottom quartile of the donor-
speciﬁc distribution of output gaps (log-linear and OECD in columns 1 and 2; and deviations of GDP growth from trend falling in the bottom quartile of
the donor-speciﬁc distribution of GDP growth rates in column 3). Recipient shocks are TOT collapse (column 4), climatic disaster (column 5); and growth
collapse (column 6). The interaction between donor and recipient large shocks refers to the donor’s output gap falling into the bottom quartile and the
recipient experiencing a TOT shock (column 7), climatic disaster (column 8) and growth collapse (column 9).
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% signiﬁcance level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% signiﬁcance level.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% signiﬁcance level.
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ODA in the deﬁnition above, thus eliminating principal
repayments made by the recipient. However, this measure is
not perfect since interest repayments, which are sometimes
large, are not captured in the OECD-DAC database. Our
second measure corresponds to Net Aid Transfers (NAT)—
disbursements net of both principal and interest repayments
(Roodman, 2005). Our third measure is the original depen-
dent variable from which we also subtract imputed multilat-
eral aid, which captures aid disbursements by multilateral
agencies attributable to individual donors. 14 Excluding these
ﬂows from our aid aggregate addresses the possibility that net
ODA increases when recipients suﬀer large shocks because
donor increase their contributions to multilateral rather than
bilateral development agencies.
Notwithstanding some variation in the size of the coeﬃ-
cients, the estimates produced by alternate dependent vari-
ables (Table 6) are consistent with our baseline results.
Regardless of the deﬁnition of donor eﬀort employed—gross
ODA, Net Aid Transfers, or net ODA excluding multilateralcontributions—the estimates suggest that aid is procyclical
with respect to the business cycle in both donor and recipient
countries. Furthermore, aid becomes countercyclical when
developing countries experience large adverse macroeconomic
shocks.
(b) Alternative speciﬁcations
If past aid levels have a causal impact on current aid alloca-
tions, our model speciﬁcation should reﬂect this. Aggregate
aid ﬁgures show a high degree of persistence induced, among
others, by the multi-year planning process. In addition, donors
look at past ﬁgures in deciding their present and future aid
budgets, and could ﬁnd it diﬃcult to alter the trend when
aid-receiving countries experience unexpected shocks. To al-
low for the possibility that past aid ﬂows aﬀect current dis-
bursements, we re-estimate the baseline model with lagged
aid as an explanatory variable. The lagged dependent variable
causes a dynamic panel bias problem that aﬀects the estimated
coeﬃcients for all regressors. In particular, the coeﬃcient on
Table 6. Robustness to alternative deﬁnitions of the dependent variable
Donor cycle Recipient
cycle
Output
gap
Output
gap
(OECD)
1 = Above-
trend
(GDP)
growth
1 = Output
gap
bottom
quartile
1 = Output
gap
bottom
quartile
(OECD)
1 = Growth
deviation in
bottom
quartile
Output
gap
1 = Below-
trend
(GDP)
growth
1 = Below-
trend
(cons.)
growth
1 = TOT
collapse
1 = Climatic
disaster
1 =
Growth
collapse
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
A. Gross ODA (excl. humanitarian aid, emergency food aid, debt relief grants)
Log-Recipient GDP 0.16 0.21 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
(0.22) (0.25) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22)
Log-Rec GDP trend 0.55** 0.55** 0.86*** 0.73*** 0.56** 0.45*
(0.26) (0.27) (0.30) (0.28) (0.26) (0.26)
Log-Recipient population 3.78*** 4.54*** 4.07*** 3.78*** 3.78*** 3.78*** 5.43*** 5.58*** 6.26*** 5.19*** 5.44*** 5.54***
(0.56) (0.63) (0.57) (0.56) (0.56) (0.56) (0.62) (0.64) (0.72) (0.63) (0.62) (0.62)
Log-Donor population 2.46* 1.70 0.90 1.50 0.90 0.96 3.07** 2.83* 2.77* 2.96** 3.07** 3.07**
(1.41) (1.57) (1.45) (1.40) (1.40) (1.40) (1.48) (1.53) (1.64) (1.50) (1.48) (1.48)
Log-Donor GDP trend 4.99*** 4.48*** 5.10*** 4.91*** 4.70*** 4.72*** 5.71*** 5.90*** 6.08*** 5.63*** 5.71*** 5.71***
(0.71) (0.91) (0.73) (0.72) (0.71) (0.71) (0.74) (0.76) (0.82) (0.75) (0.74) (0.74)
Recipient war index 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.23*** 0.23***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Donor cycle proxy 0.08*** 0.06*** 0.29*** 0.56*** 0.28*** 0.13*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Recipient cycle proxy 0.01 0.08** 0.13*** 0.22*** 0.20*** 0.36***
(0.00) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.09)
Observations 81,290 72,344 79,178 81,290 81,290 81,290 72,248 70,246 63,844 69,696 72,248 72,248
Within R-squared 0.18 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.19
Number of country-pairs 2,486 2,486 2,486 2,486 2,486 2,486 2,288 2,288 2,134 2,156 2,288 2,288
B. Net Aid Transfers (i.e., ODA net of principal and interest payments on ODA loans)
Log-Recipient GDP 0.21*** 0.23*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Log-Rec GDP trend 0.31*** 0.32*** 0.42*** 0.38*** 0.32*** 0.30***
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Log-Recipient population 0.05 0.10 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.19 0.24* 0.27* 0.14 0.20 0.21
(0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.15) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Log-Donor population 0.71** 0.12 0.35 0.46 0.29 0.31 0.86*** 0.89*** 1.03*** 0.88*** 0.86*** 0.86***
(0.30) (0.34) (0.31) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.33) (0.34) (0.36) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33)
Log-Donor GDP trend 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.09 0.09 0.18 0.20 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.18
(0.11) (0.15) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Recipient war index 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Donor cycle proxy 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.16*** 0.05*** 0.01 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Recipient cycle proxy 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
(continued on next page)
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Table 6—(continued)
Donor cycle Recipient cycle
Output
gap
Output
gap
(OECD)
1 = Above-
trend
(GDP)
growth
1 = Output
gap
bottom
quartile
1 = Output
gap
bottom
quartile
(OECD)
1 = Growth
deviation in
bottom
quartile
Output
gap
1 = Below-
trend
(GDP)
growth
1 = Below-
trend
(cons.)
growth
1 = TOT
collapse
1 = Climatic
disaster
1 =
Growth
collapse
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
Observations 81,290 72,344 79,178 81,290 81,290 81,290 72,248 70,246 63,844 69,696 72,248 72,248
Within R-squared 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Number of country-pairs 2,486 2,486 2,486 2,486 2,486 2,486 2,288 2,288 2,134 2,156 2,288 2,288
C. Further exclude imputed multilateral aid from benchmark dependent variable
Log-Recipient GDP 0.15*** 0.16** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Log-Rec GDP trend 0.18** 0.18** 0.12 0.12 0.17** 0.21***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Log-Recipient population 0.37*** 0.39*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.43*** 0.43*** 0.30* 0.39*** 0.44*** 0.48***
(0.12) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14)
Log-Donor population 1.61*** 1.99*** 2.09*** 1.73*** 1.91*** 1.89*** 1.70*** 1.89*** 1.79*** 1.68*** 1.70*** 1.70***
(0.34) (0.38) (0.35) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.38) (0.39) (0.41) (0.39) (0.38) (0.38)
Log-Donor GDP trend 0.27** 0.10 0.21 0.28** 0.22 0.22 0.28* 0.23 0.15 0.26* 0.28* 0.28*
(0.14) (0.17) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Recipient war index 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.05****** 0.05***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Donor cycle proxy 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01 0.17*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Recipient cycle proxy 0.01*** 0.04*** 0.03** 0.06*** 0.01 0.13***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Observations 81,290 72,344 79,178 81,290 81,290 81,290 72,248 70,246 63,844 69,696 72,248 72,248
Within R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06
Number of country-pairs 2,486 2,486 2,486 2,486 2,486 2,486 2,288 2,288 2,134 2,156 2,288 2,288
Notes: Same as Table 2 except for change in the deﬁnition of the dependent variable as indicated in the title of each panel. Estimates are based on the full sample.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% signiﬁcance level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% signiﬁcance level.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% signiﬁcance level.
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Table 7. Robustness across speciﬁcations
Donor cycle Recipient cycle
Output
gap
Output
gap
(OECD)
1 = Above-
trend
(GDP)
growth
1 = Output
gap
bottom
quartile
1 = Output
gap
bottom
quartile
(OECD)
1 = Growth
deviation in
bottom
quartile
Output
gap
1 = Below-
trend
(GDP)
growth
1 = Below-
trend
(cons.)
growth
1 = TOT
collapse
1 = Climatic
disaster
1 = Growth
collapse
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
Panel A. Control for lagged aid
Log(real aid ﬂows), t  1 0.52*** 0.51*** 0.52*** 0.52*** 0.52*** 0.52*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.50***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Log-Recipient GDP 0.41*** 0.45*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.41***
(0.13) (0.15) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Log-Rec GDP trend 0.69*** 0.69*** 0.97*** 0.81*** 0.71*** 0.62***
(0.17) (0.17) (0.19) (0.18) (0.16) (0.17)
Log-Recipient population 1.34*** 1.63*** 1.33*** 1.33*** 1.33*** 1.32*** 2.16*** 2.13*** 2.73*** 1.97*** 2.17*** 2.24***
(0.32) (0.37) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.38) (0.38) (0.45) (0.39) (0.38) (0.38)
Log-Donor population 0.57 1.91* 1.60* 1.03 1.65* 1.60* 0.57 0.63 1.17 0.62 0.57 0.57
(0.88) (1.01) (0.87) (0.87) (0.87) (0.87) (0.98) (0.98) (1.07) (1.00) (0.98) (0.98)
Log-Donor GDP trend 2.84*** 2.07*** 2.73*** 2.92*** 2.72*** 2.74*** 3.15*** 3.17*** 3.21*** 3.09*** 3.16*** 3.16***
(0.39) (0.52) (0.38) (0.39) (0.38) (0.38) (0.42) (0.42) (0.46) (0.43) (0.42) (0.42)
Recipient war index 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.14***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Donor cycle proxy 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.14*** 0.50*** 0.20*** 0.13** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Recipient cycle proxy 0.00 0.04 0.14*** 0.10 0.14*** 0.27***
(0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07)
Observations 79,178 71,480 79,178 79,178 79,178 79,178 70,554 70,246 63,844 68,046 70,554 70,554
Within R-squared 0.33 0.30 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.32
Number of country-pairs 2,486 2,486 2,486 2,486 2,486 2,486 2,288 2,288 2,134 2,156 2,288 2,288
Panel B. Drop “no relationship”
pairs
Log-Recipient GDP 0.25 0.29 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
(0.23) (0.26) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
Log-Rec GDP trend 0.55** 0.55** 0.89*** 0.76*** 0.57** 0.45*
(0.27) (0.27) (0.31) (0.29) (0.26) (0.27)
Log-Recipient population 4.30*** 4.90*** 4.60*** 4.31*** 4.31*** 4.31*** 5.60*** 5.76*** 6.45*** 5.34*** 5.62*** 5.71***
(0.58) (0.65) (0.60) (0.58) (0.58) (0.58) (0.64) (0.65) (0.74) (0.65) (0.64) (0.63)
Log-Donor population 2.40 1.87 0.71 1.40 0.74 0.77 2.70* 2.49 2.47 2.59 2.71* 2.69*
(1.51) (1.68) (1.56) (1.50) (1.50) (1.50) (1.56) (1.62) (1.74) (1.59) (1.56) (1.56)
Log-Donor GDP trend 5.98*** 5.25*** 6.06*** 5.90*** 5.64*** 5.65*** 6.09*** 6.30*** 6.54*** 6.02*** 6.09*** 6.08***
(0.73) (0.97) (0.75) (0.73) (0.72) (0.72) (0.76) (0.78) (0.84) (0.77) (0.76) (0.76)
Recipient war index 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.18*** 0.20*** 0.23*** 0.24***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Donor cycle proxy 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.32*** 0.60*** 0.29*** 0.17*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Recipient cycle proxy 0.01 0.09** 0.14*** 0.24*** 0.20*** 0.39***
(0.00) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.05) (0.10)
(continued on next page)
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BUSINESS CYCLE FLUCTUATIONS, LARGE MACROECONOMIC SHOCKS, AND DEVELOPMENT AID 57the lagged dependent variable is biased upward while the
coeﬃcients on other regressors are biased downward
(Maddala & Rao, 1973). We proceed under the assumption
that the time period (T = 36) is long enough for the dynamic
panel bias to be small and estimate the model with OLS
and country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects. 15 The results are reported in
Table 7 (Panel A). Accounting for the persistence of develop-
ment aid ﬂows does not appear to materially aﬀect our main
results. Foreign aid increases during donor upturns for all
proxies of the cycle. The results hold up for all proxies
of the recipient cycle in all-but-two speciﬁcations (namely,
columns 8 and 10).
Another concern that is typical in studies of bilateral
ﬂows are the numerous zero-aid observations (see, e.g., Dutt
& Traca, 2010, on this problem for bilateral trade ﬂows). So
far we have kept these observations in the sample by adding
$1 to the aid ﬂows before the logarithmic transformation,
on the assumption that there is an aid relationship even if
we do not observe one. We check the sensitivity of our re-
sults to the inclusion of zero-aid observations by re-estimat-
ing the model conditional on observing at least one nonzero
aid ﬂow in the country-pair during the sample period. This
leads us to drop some 5,500 observations or 6.15% of coun-
try-pairs. The coeﬃcient estimates (Table 7, Panel B) are
similar to those for the full sample and conﬁrm that our
baseline results are not driven by no-relationship country
pairs.(c) Regressions by sub-period
It is often argued that the end of the Cold War changed the
nature of bilateral aid. In particular, geopolitical concerns now
play a more muted role (Ball & Johnson, 1996; Meernik,
Krueger, & Poe, 1998; Fleck & Kilby, 2010) while aid selectiv-
ity criteria such as growth performance or the quality of insti-
tutions have a more prominent impact on aid allocations
(Bandyopadhyay & Wall, 2007; Berthelemy & Tichit, 2004;
McGillivray, 2005). We check whether our core results hold
up in the pre- and post-Cold War period by adding a post-
1989 indicator variable together with interactions with mea-
sures of the business cycle. Small or statistically insigniﬁcant
coeﬃcients on the interaction terms would suggest that there
is no diﬀerence in the cyclical behavior of bilateral aid ﬂows
pre- and post-1990.
Table 8 shows that the interactions terms on the donor cy-
cle variables are all statistically insigniﬁcant, suggesting that
bilateral aid disbursements have been equally procyclical rel-
ative to the donor cycle before and after 1990 (columns 1–3).
However, the results are more mixed for the large shock vari-
ables, with only two interaction coeﬃcients turning out sta-
tistically signiﬁcant (columns 4–6). There is some evidence
that the cyclical properties of foreign aid we have identiﬁed
in the baseline results are present mainly in the post-Cold
War sample (columns 7–12). This is consistent with the view
that economic concerns have become more important in the
post-Cold War era.(d) Alternative estimation techniques
Lastly, we check for the sensitivity of our results to alter-
native estimators. The baseline model has been estimated
with country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects which model unobserved
time-invariant characteristics that may determine the
likelihood of a pair-wise relationship. We consider four
alternative estimators: (a) pooled OLS, which treats
Table 8. Robustness across sub-periods (pre/post Cold War)
Donor cycle Recipient cycle
Output
gap
Output
gap
(OECD)
1 = Above-
trend
growth
1 = Output
gap
bottom
quartile
1 = Output
gap
bottom
quartile
(OECD)
1 = Growth
deviation in
bottom
quartile
Output
gap
1 = Below-
trend
GDP
growth
1 = Below-
trend
consumption
growth
1 = TOT
growth
rate in
bottom
decile
1 = Climatic
disaster
1 = Growth
collapse
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
Log-Recipient GDP 0.76*** 0.88*** 0.76*** 0.76*** 0.76*** 0.76***
(0.26) (0.30) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26)
Log-Rec GDP trend 1.35*** 1.32*** 1.77*** 1.60*** 1.32*** 1.29***
(0.32) (0.33) (0.37) (0.34) (0.32) (0.31)
Log-Recipient population 3.14*** 3.79*** 3.38*** 3.14*** 3.14*** 3.14*** 4.76*** 4.79*** 5.18*** 4.36*** 4.74*** 4.83******
(0.64) (0.73) (0.65) (0.64) (0.64) (0.64) (0.73) (0.75) (0.84) (0.75) (0.73) (0.73)
Log-Donor population 0.59 1.09 1.96 0.67 1.63 1.48 0.82 0.19 0.21 0.75 0.82 0.82
(1.70) (1.93) (1.77) (1.70) (1.71) (1.71) (1.84) (1.91) (2.05) (1.87) (1.84) (1.84)
Log-Donor GDP trend 5.33*** 3.99*** 5.26*** 5.26*** 4.86*** 4.92*** 5.98*** 6.06*** 6.15*** 5.87*** 5.98*** 5.98***
(0.76) (1.00) (0.77) (0.75) (0.74) (0.74) (0.78) (0.80) (0.87) (0.80) (0.78) (0.78)
Recipient war index 0.27*** 0.27*** 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.27*** 0.28***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Donor cycle proxy 0.11*** 0.08*** 0.25*** 0.98*** 0.14 0.01 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.11***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Donor cycle proxy 
(1 = Post-Cold War)
0.00 0.00 0.07 0.19 0.37** 0.22*
(0.01) (0.03) (0.11) (0.16) (0.16) (0.12)
Recipient cycle proxy 0.01 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.59*** 0.67***
(0.01) (0.07) (0.08) (0.12) (0.11) (0.16)
Recipient cycle proxy 
(1 = Post-Cold War)
0.01 0.38*** 0.23* 0.26 0.62*** 0.35*
(0.01) (0.10) (0.12) (0.18) (0.17) (0.21)
1 = Post-Cold War 2.98*** 5.22*** 1.59*** 3.04*** 0.70 2.79*** 3.91*** 0.83*** 0.81*** 3.88*** 3.97*** 3.91***
(0.95) (0.69) (0.31) (0.95) (0.62) (0.79) (1.06) (0.17) (0.17) (1.08) (1.06) (1.05)
Observations 81,290 72,344 79,178 81,290 81,290 81,290 72,248 70,246 63,844 69,696 72,248 72,248
Within R-squared 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09
Number of country-pairs 2,486 2,486 2,486 2,486 2,486 2,486 2,288 2,288 2,134 2,156 2,288 2,288
Notes: Same as Table 2. Estimates are based on the full sample.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% signiﬁcance level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% signiﬁcance level.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% signiﬁcance level.
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BUSINESS CYCLE FLUCTUATIONS, LARGE MACROECONOMIC SHOCKS, AND DEVELOPMENT AID 59donor-recipient-year cells as independent observations,
ignoring the two-way cross-sectional and time series
dimensions of the data; (b) donor and recipient (or country)
ﬁxed eﬀects, which control for time-invariant unobserved
heterogeneity at the country (but not country-pair) level;
(c) donor and recipient ﬁxed eﬀects interacted with
time, which allow for time-varying unobserved heterogeneity
at the country (but not country-pair) level; and (d)
donor-year, recipient-year, and country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects.
We also consider the Tobit estimator with random eﬀects
to account for the censored nature of the dependent variable.
In all speciﬁcations we include time eﬀects to control for
global shocks.
For brevity, in Table 9 we report only the main coeﬃcient
estimates corresponding to each estimator. We note that the
benchmark results carry through when we change the estima-
tion technique (columns 1–9), in particular when we saturate
the model with dummies that capture country and country-
pair features that may both aﬀect aid disbursements and be
correlated with the output cycle, but are diﬃcult to measure
or observe. Negative growth episodes in aid-receiving coun-
tries are robustly associated with higher aid ﬂows (column
12). When it comes to negative TOT shocks or climatic disas-
ters, the coeﬃcients lose statistical signiﬁcance for some esti-
mators (columns 10 and 11).5. CONCLUSIONS
The severity of the recent ﬁnancial crisis and its swift trans-
mission worldwide have prompted new interest in studying the
behavior of foreign aid during economic downturns—both in
donor and recipient countries. The issue is particularly rele-
vant for policymakers, as many donors currently face the
looming specter of a protracted recession. In this paper, we
have empirically analyzed the link between the business cycles
in donor and recipient countries and development aid ﬂows,
paying particular attention to periods of acute macroeconomic
stress.
Using a large dataset on bilateral aid disbursements, we
have estimated a parsimonious aid allocation model and
found that aid ﬂows are on average procyclical with
respect to the donor and recipient output cycles. We have
also presented novel evidence regarding the link between
large macroeconomic shocks and aid ﬂows. While aid con-
tracts sharply during severe downturns in donor countries,
it turns countercyclical when developing countries experience
unusually large shocks. Our ﬁndings are robust to changes
in speciﬁcation, the deﬁnition of aid, and estimation
technique.
A question that naturally arises from our analysis is how
aid disbursements will evolve in the near future given
stressed economic conditions in some donor countries. In
the aftermath of the 2008–09 crisis, development aid
continued to rise in 2010 but it has declined since 2011
(OECD-DAC., 2013). The evidence presented here may
not be the best basis for projections given the severity of
the global ﬁnancial crisis and the ongoing debt-related
concerns in advanced economies. Nonetheless, our key ﬁnding
that deep recessions in donor countries have historically
triggered persistent declines in foreign aid suggests that
there are signiﬁcant downside risks to the outlook for
aid. The upside is that large negative shocks in developing
countries have historically been met with higher aid ﬂows
than previously thought.
60 WORLD DEVELOPMENTNOTES1. Sub-Saharan African countries have been the main beneﬁciary of the
increased aid ﬂows since the late 1990s.
2. Similar results were obtained in earlier studies, see, e.g., Dang, Knack,
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and Robe (2001).
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